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“Public sector companies can often support much lower 
levels of interest cover than private concerns because of 
the lower risks.”:  (OFWAT-International Comparisons of 
Water and Sewerage Services) 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
1.1   In a paper in the January 2006 issue of this 
Commentary, [Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2006], we identified 
a number of errors in the financial control of the water 
industry in Scotland. These errors had resulted in serious 
overcharging in the strategic review 2002-06, with, we 
argued, knock on effects to the 2006-10 period. A meeting 
with the Chairman of the Water Industry Commission, Sir 
Ian Byatt, was held on 22
nd 
February at the Scottish 
Parliament to discuss one particular symptom of this, the 
high levels of new capital expenditure funded out of 
revenue in the water industry in Scotland. 
 
To illustrate the latter point, on the basis of outturn figures 
in Scottish Water’s published accounts, [Scottish Water, 
annual] and the projections in the Final Determination of 
Charges 2006-10, [Water Industry Commission for 
Scotland, 2005], the amount of net new capital 
expenditure, (that is the formation of capital assets over 
and above depreciation), funded from revenue will be at 
least £600 million in 2002-06, and is projected to be over 
£400 million in 2006-10. The amount of net new capital 
formation funded out of revenue over the period 2002-10 
will therefore be over £1 billion: over the same period, the 
total amount of net new capital formation will be around 
£2.1 billion. Given the normal principle that net new capital 
formation should be funded from borrowing, the high 
proportion of net new capital formation being funded from 
revenue represents a strong prima facie case that there will 
have been very substantial overcharging of water 
customers in Scotland over the period. 
 
1.2   At the meeting, Sir Ian refused to discuss the strategic 
review 2002-06, arguing that this was not the legal 
responsibility of the Water Industry Commission, which was 
formally constituted only in July 2005. However, Sir Ian 
was prepared to discuss the 2006-10 period, and argued 
that the revenue caps set in strategic review 2006-10 were 
justified in terms of the need to meet targets for certain key 
financial ratios: these ratios, and the targets set for them, 
were the same as used by OFWAT in its review of charges 
for the water industry in England and Wales: [OFWAT, 
2004]. Sir Ian justified the use of the same ratios, and 
indeed the same targets for these ratios as in England and 
Wales, by the need to avoid risk. Our initial response at the 
meeting was that the use of the same ratios and targets for 
private companies like the English water and sewage 
companies, and a public body like Scottish Water, was 
unjustifiable, given that public and private bodies face very 
different risk profiles. We undertook at the meeting to 
develop more fully our thoughts on the differences in risk 
for public and private bodies: this forms the primary subject 
of this paper. Our conclusion is that the straight application 
of OFWAT targets is indeed unjustifiable: this will inevitably 
result in overcharging, and the funding of too much capital 
expenditure out of revenue. We look to Sir Ian to justify his 
position that it is appropriate to apply the OFWAT ratios 
and targets to Scottish Water without modification. 
 
1.3   The above discussion on appropriate financial ratios 
and targets forms the main subject matter of this paper. 
However, in carrying out this research, we observed an 
apparent difference in the calculation of current cost profit 
between that used in strategic review 2006-10 in Scotland, 
and the definition used by OFWAT in their Regulatory 
Accounts: [OFWAT, 2003]. This is described in the 
penultimate section of the paper. The effect is that profits in 
Scotland are significantly understated, compared to what 
they would be if OFWAT conventions were used. On the 
basis of OFWAT definitions, it appears that strategic review 
2006-10 is projecting pre-tax profits of almost £900 million, 
and post-tax profits of over £500 million, over the period 
2006-10. These high profit levels are again consistent with 
the view that substantial overcharging of customers has 
continued in strategic review 2006-10. 
 
 
2.  How appropriate are the OFWAT financial 
ratios and targets for the purpose of controlling 
risk in Scotland 
2.1   Chapter 26 of the Final Determination of Charge for 
2006-10 sets out the key financial assumptions that were 
used in the determination of the charge caps. An important 
part of this process was the use of financial ratios and 
targets to assess the financial strength of Scottish Water. 
The ratios chosen, and their target values, were the same 
as five out of the six ratios used in OFWAT’s 2004 price 
review for England and Wales. The relevant ratios and 
targets are set out in the following table. 
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Financial ratios 
 
Financial Ratio Target Value 
Cash Interest Cover Around 3 times 
Adjusted cash interest cover Around 1.6 times 
Funds from operations: Debt Greater than 13% 
Retained cash flow: Debt Greater than 7% 
Gearing Less than 65% 
 
 
The definitions of these ratios, given on page 273 of the 
Final Determination, are as follows: 
 
Cash Interest Cover 
= (Net Operating Cash Flow - Tax)/ Interest, 
where net operating cash flow = Turnover - 
Operating Expenditure. 
 
Adjusted Cash Interest Cover 
= (Net Operating Cash Flow - Depreciation - 
Infrastructure Renewals -Tax)/ Interest 
 
Ratio of Funds from Operations : Debt 
= (Net Operating Cash Flow - Tax -Interest)/ Net 
Debt 
 
Ratio of Retained Cash Flow : Debt 
= (Net Operating Cash Flow - Tax - Interest - 
Dividends)/ Net Debt 
 
Gearing =Net Debt / RCV, 
where RCV is the Regulatory Capital Value, which 
represents the value of the regulated business on 
which Scottish Water can earn a return: this is 
essentially a proxy for the market value of the 
business. 
 
Note that since Scottish Water, as a public company, does 
not pay dividends, retained cash flow will equal funds from 
operations: so the value of the fourth ratio will always equal 
the third ratio. 
 
2.2   In our meeting with Sir Ian Byatt, he stressed that the 
key ratio and target, which more than any other had 
determined the revenue caps, was the third ratio, namely, 
“funds from operations:debt”. 
 
Chapter 26 of the Final Determination justifies the 
application of the OFWAT ratios and targets as follows: 
 
“We have also noted that these financial ratios were 
developed in consultation with the water companies, the 
City, and the credit rating agencies. We believe that these 
ratios are therefore likely to represent a fair market 
assessment of the appropriate split between current and 
future financing needs. We can see no reason why Scottish 
Water should not seek to match the financial strength of 
the companies in England and Wales”. 
 
 
On the face of it, this is a surprising statement, given the 
quotation from OFWAT reproduced at the start of this 
paper. In this section, we argue in greater detail 
a) why indicators of the OFWAT type cannot be relied upon 
as the primary method of assessing or controlling a 
company like Scottish Water: and 
 
b) why in any event, the OFWAT targets have to be 
modified before being applied to Scottish Water, because 
of the different circumstances facing Scottish Water as 
compared to the English and Welsh Water and Sewerage 
Companies, (WASCs). 
 
2.4   As the quotation in the paragraph above makes clear, 
the OFWAT ratios have been primarily modelled on the 
kind of indicator used by the markets to assess the risks 
associated with a company. Two of the classic traps, and 
therefore risks, into which a company can fall are:- 
 
Runaway cycle of borrowing 
This is the risk that a company gets itself into a position 
where it is borrowing to cover current costs like operating 
expenses, depreciation, and interest. This could lead to an 
exponential growth in debt unbacked by productive capital 
assets, with ultimate danger of financial collapse. 
 
Collapse of customer base through over-charging 
This is the risk that, because customer charges are set too 
high, the revenue generating base of customers may grow 
more slowly than the requirement for revenue, leading to a 
vicious circle of further increases in charges, and so on. In 
a competitive market, this could be followed by rapid 
collapse: in a monopoly market, collapse is unlikely to be 
rapid, but may nevertheless ensue in the longer term. Note 
that, because there is a substantial fixed cost element in 
water company operations, (in terms of a largely fixed 
capital base, depreciation, and interest charges), once the 
customer base starts to shrink, the rise in unit fixed costs 
poses a real danger of a self-perpetuating cycle becoming 
established. There are a number of ways in which a 
company might fall into this particular trap - for example, it 
might come about through failure to achieve required 
operating cost efficiencies, or through attempting to finance 
too high a proportion of capital expenditure out of revenue. 
 
2.5   The first of the above two risks will be associated with 
high levels of borrowing throughout, while at least in its 
initial stage, the second risk may well be associated with 
low borrowing. The OFWAT ratios, with their stress on debt 
and interest costs, are weighted towards detecting the 
emergence of the first of these risks. For a private 
company operating in a competitive market, this is probably 
fair enough, since the second risk, over-charging, will 
normally be penalised anyway by the operation of 
competition, leading to an easily detectable decline in 
profits and in market share. There is thus little need for the 
market to have developed special indicators to detect the 
problem of over-charging. 
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2.6   For a company operating in a market where there is 
limited competition, however, (like a water company), then 
the normal competitive checks against over-charging will 
not apply. In these circumstances, the asymmetry in the 
OFWAT financial ratios does matter: if too much reliance 
were placed on the OFWAT ratios alone, then while this 
would avoid the danger of over-borrowing, (because the 
OFWAT ratios guard against this), there would be a very 
real risk of falling into the opposite trap of over-charging. Of 
course, for a water company or similar utility, the place of 
the market check on over-charging is supposed to be taken 
by the role of the regulator, one of whose primary 
responsibilities is to guard against over-charging. Thus, in 
England and Wales, Severn Trent Water Company was 
recently fined by the regulator for over-charging. The 
important point we wish to make here, however, is that for 
companies in the position of Scottish Water or the WASCs, 
it is not enough to set revenue caps purely or primarily by 
reference to the types of financial ratios listed above: it is 
also necessary to consider carefully and directly whether 
there is evidence of over-charging, which could show up, 
for example, in the form of excess profits. We shall argue 
later that there is indeed evidence, as regards the strategic 
review 2006-10, of over-charging being overlooked, or of 
being given insufficient weight. 
 
2.7   We now show that, in any event, there are strong 
arguments for saying that the OFWAT ratios have not been 
calculated appropriately for Scotland, but either need to be 
modified, or in one case, (the gearing ratio), should not be 
calculated at all. The reasons are as follows. 
 
Gearing ratio 
2.8   The gearing ratio, as noted above, is the ratio of debt 
to RCV.  We argue that this ratio is meaningless for 
Scotland, given the way RCV is currently calculated in 
Scotland. As the discussion on page 270-1 of the Final 
Determination makes clear, the RCV for Scottish Water 
was not based on any absolute method of determination, 
but was calculated so that, in 2009-10, “the cash allowed 
return on the RCV and the allowance for embedded debt 
was equal to the difference between the required level of 
revenue and the allowed level of costs.” In other words, the 
RCV for Scotland is an imputed figure, calculated so that 
the product of RCV times the assumed rate of return gives 
a required amount of cash: this means that the value of the 
RCV is a relative concept, which varies in inverse 
proportion to the assumed rate of return. A problem arises 
when such a relative concept as the RCV is compared with 
an absolute concept, namely, debt, as is done in 
calculating the gearing ratio. It is difficult to see how the 
concept of gearing for Scotland can have any meaning, 
unless some more objective and absolute way of 
calculating Scottish RCV can be determined. Note that this 
problem does not arise in England, since RCV there is 
based upon rolling forward the market value from the time 
of privatisation. 
Another problem with the Scottish method of calculating 
RCV arises because of the error acknowledged on page 
295 of the Final Determination in double counting inflation 
in rolling forward RCV. This error apparently has a very 
large effect on assessed RCV values: the following 
quotation, from page 296, indicates the effects of correcting 
for this error- “If we changed our model so that it implied an 
initial RCV using a real rate of return, the initial RCV would 
become around £11 billion. This is around double the 
upper end of the range suggested by the Commissioner’s 
analysis. In our view, such a large RCV could not be 
justified.” 
 
What we take from this quotation is that there must be a 
further huge element of uncertainty about the particular 
RCV values attributed to Scottish Water in the Final 
Determination. Given the relative and uncertain nature of 
the Scottish RCV figure, calculation of a gearing ratio 
based on the Scottish RCV is meaningless. 
 
The difficulty of comparing debt between Scottish Water 
and the WASCs. 
2.9 The remaining four OFWAT ratios all depend in some 
way or other on debt, (or the related quantity, interest). 
There is, however, a fundamental difference between a 
public body like Scottish Water, and the private WASCs in 
England, in that the former only has access to two main 
sources of finance, (debt, and retained profits), while the 
latter have access to three, (debt, retained profits, and 
equity). To restrain Scottish Water and the English 
companies to the same level of debt, therefore, would be to 
throw a greater burden on retained profits for Scottish 
Water, since, unlike the English companies, it does not 
have the option of accessing equity finance. 
 
This point is acknowledged on page 345 of the Final 
Determination, where there is the following discussion 
about the possibility of relaxing the OFWAT “funds from 
operations divided by debt” target, (the key third ratio), for 
Scottish Water: “The rationale for allowing this ratio to be 
breached would be that Scottish Water is funded entirely 
by customer charges and debt, and there is no indication 
that the Scottish Executive will seek to require Scottish 
Water to pay a dividend on any retained earnings. From 
this standpoint, complying with this ratio could reasonably 
be regarded as challenging.” 
 
In the event, the Final Determination did not go down the 
road of relaxing the third ratio constraint, because the 
resulting reductions in charges would have breached the 
Ministerial Guidance on charges, and because of public 
expenditure constraints. However, the important point for 
present purposes is that the sentiment expressed in the 
above quotation is one with which we absolutely agree: 
setting the same targets in respect to debt ratios for 
Scottish Water as for the English companies is much 
tougher for Scottish Water. 
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2.10   To get round this problem, we really need to 
consider the following question: “If the equity finance of the 
WASCs were replaced by conventional debt, how much 
conventional debt could they take on without experiencing 
any additional risk?” 
 
If one regards the equity finance raised by the WASCs as a 
form of proxy debt, then 
 
(a)   it is much more expensive than conventional debt: as 
can be seen from the information in tables 1 and 7 of 
[OFWAT, 2005a,], the WASCs have recently been paying 
annual dividends equivalent to over 18% of the equity 
capital actually raised: and this is after tax. 
conservative basis, that the cost of debt for the WASCs 
over the foreseeable future is likely to be at least 20% more 
than that for Scottish Water. 
 
2.12 Given the above, therefore, it follows that the 
equivalent to the ratio of 
 
funds from operations 
debt 
 
for Scottish Water would be the ratio 
 
funds from operations 
 
But 
 
 
for the WASCs. 
1.2(debt + equity finance) 
 
(b)   a private company, in any given year, does not have to 
pay a dividend: so equity finance provides a greater 
cushion against imminent failure in times of financial 
stringency. An element of equity finance gives a company 
a less brittle financial structure. 
 
If, therefore, one was seeking an appropriate conversion 
factor from equity finance to conventional debt, the above 
two arguments would point in different directions: since 
equity finance is more costly than conventional debt,  a 
given amount of equity finance would cost the same as a 
significantly larger amount of conventional debt: so in this 
sense equity finance would convert to conventional debt at 
a factor greater than one. But equity finance leads to a less 
brittle financial structure than conventional debt: so in this 
sense, equity finance should convert to conventional debt 
at a factor less than one. To balance up these two 
conflicting effects, we take a factor of 1 as a reasonable 
conversion factor from equity finance to conventional debt. 
Given the very high cost of equity finance to the WASCs, 
this is probably a conservative assumption: in other words, 
the WASCs could probably replace their equity finance with 
We therefore need to establish what value of the latter ratio 
would be equivalent to a target value of 13% for (funds 
from operations)/(debt) for the WASCs. The calculation is as 
follows. 
 
First, from Table 7 in [OFWAT, 2005a], it can be seen that, 
in 2004, the debt of the WASCs was £24525 million, and 
their called up share capital plus share premium, 
(equivalent to the capital raised by means of equity), was 
£6596 million, implying that 
 
debt + equity finance 
=  1.27 
debt 
 
Hence, for the WASCs, if 
 
funds from operations 
=  0.13 , 
debt 
 
then 
a larger amount of conventional debt without incurring any 
additional risk. 
 
2.11 Another factor that must be taken into account in 
determining equivalent levels of debt between Scottish 
Water and the WASCs is the fact that Scottish Water can 
funds from operations 
(debt + equity finance) 
 
 
and 
0.13 
= 
1.27 
 
=  0.102 
borrow more cheaply than a typical WASC, since the 
former is borrowing from the Scottish Consolidated Fund at 
public sector rates, rather than market rates. In setting 
water and sewerage charges for England and Wales for 
the period 2005-2010, OFWAT assumed that the real pre- 
funds from operations 
1.2 * (debt + equity finance) 
. 
0.102 
= 
1.2 
 
=  0.085 
tax cost of debt for the WASCs, (that is, the cost over the 
entire debt base of the companies), would be 4.3%, 
[OFWAT, 2004, page 219]: this would be equivalent to 
about 6.8% in nominal terms. From pages 121 and 122 of 
Appendix 9 to the Final Determination of water charges in 
Scotland, it can be seen that the projected average interest 
rate to be paid by Scottish Water on government loans 
varies between 5.8% and 5.3% over the period 2006 to 
2010. Given these figures, it seems safe to assume, on a 
The equivalent target for the ratio of funds from operations 
to debt for Scottish Water should thus be around 8.5%, 
rather than 13%. 
 
2.13  Clearly, the specific assumptions we have used in 
the above calculations are subject to fine tuning. 
Nevertheless, the basic principle remains, that if allowance 
were made for the more limited sources of finance 
available to Scottish Water, then the OFWAT targets would 
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need to be significantly adjusted. While we have worked 
through the arithmetic for the key third ratio, similar 
principles would apply to the other ratios involving debt or 
interest. 
 
3.   What light does the profit and loss account 
throw on how reasonable the revenue caps are, 
and what are the implications? 
3.1   We have argued in the previous section that revenue 
caps set for Scotland using a straight application of the 
OFWAT targets for the financial ratios are likely to give a 
distorted outcome - being unduly cautious as regards risks 
associated with over-borrowing, and failing to give 
adequate warning about the risk of overcharging. If so, we 
could expect this to show up in the projected profit and loss 
account for Scottish Water, with the company having an 
unduly large profit after allowing for operating expenses, 
depreciation, interest, and other relevant charges. 
Comparison of the projected income and expenditure 
accounts for Scottish Water on page 358 of the Final 
Determination with, for example, outturn profit and loss 
accounts for the WASCs, (in OFWAT, 2005a), suggests 
some support for this hypothesis. For example, the outturn 
current cost post-tax profit for the water industry in England 
and Wales was £123 million in 2003-04, and £213 million in 
2004-05. In comparison, the projected current cost post-tax 
surplus for Scottish Water in the final determination is 
£85.9 million in 2006-07 and totals £260.9 million over the 
five years 2006 to 2010, (and over £500 million pre-tax). 
Thus it is indeed the case that the projected surpluses of 
Scottish Water are larger, on a proportional basis, than the 
outturn profits had been for the WASCs. It could be argued 
that some or all of this difference represents the need to 
include some contingency allowance in the planned figures 
for Scottish Water: nevertheless, a cumulative pre-tax 
surplus of over £500 million does on the face of it appear 
somewhat excessive. 
 
3.2   However, a detailed examination of the projected 
accounts for Scottish Water as compared with the OFWAT 
accounts shows that there appears to be a very significant 
difference in the way in which the two sets of accounts are 
compiled. This relates to the term “financing adjustment”, 
which appears in both sets of accounts. In the OFWAT 
accounts, which are compiled in accordance with the 
Regulatory Accounting principles set out in [OFWAT 2003], 
the “financing adjustment” represents a significant income 
element in the profit and loss account, (ranging from £345 
million to £667 million over the period 2000-01 to 2004-05.) 
For OFWAT, the financing adjustment “is equivalent to the 
effect that RPI inflation has in eroding the level of net debt 
that exists at the start of the financial year.” In a profit and 
loss account which includes depreciation  of fixed assets 
adjusted for inflation on a current cost basis, as the 
OFWAT accounts do, then the logic of also including the 
benefit experienced through the erosion of outstanding 
debt by inflation appears unimpeachable. 
3.3   In the final determination current cost accounts for 
Scottish Water, while there is a term for “financing 
adjustment”, the values included under this term are trivial, 
ranging from £4 million to £8 million per annum. On the 
other hand, if a financing adjustment had been calculated 
using the OFWAT methodology, representing the eroding 
effect of retail price inflation at 2.5% on Scottish Water’s 
debt, then, on the basis of the debt projections in Table 
35.15 of the final determination, this would have amounted 
to the values set out in the following table, 
 
Financing adjustment for Scottish Water on OFWAT basis: 
£ million 
 
 
 
2006/07 65.0 
2007/08 69.0 
2008/09 74.1 
2009/10 80.7 
Total 288.8 
 
 
 
 
Given that the projected accounts for Scottish Water, like 
the OFWAT accounts, include depreciation calculated on a 
current cost basis, there appears to be no good reason 
why the financing adjustment, as calculated in this table, 
should be excluded from the accounts of Scottish Water in 
the final determination. Inclusion of this financing 
adjustment would mean that cumulative pre-tax profits over 
the period 2006-10, calculated on the same current cost 
basis as used by OFWAT, would be over £800million, and 
post-tax profits would be £550 million. This appears grossly 
excessive. We argue that this is compelling evidence that 
the use of the straight OFWAT financial ratios and 
unadjusted OFWAT targets in determining revenue caps 
for the period 2006-10 has indeed been inappropriate, and 
has resulted in serious overcharging. This in turn is likely to 
expose Scottish Water to serious risk of erosion of the 
customer base, as the excess burden of water charges 
makes Scottish business less competitive. 
 
3.4   In setting revenue caps for Scottish Water, therefore, 
we argue that not merely should the target on the key 
financial ratio have been significantly relaxed, (probably to 
around 8.5%), but that more account should have been 
taken of other dangers, like overcharging. This would have 
involved looking, among other things, at projected retained 
profits, (calculated using the OFWAT Regulatory 
Accounting conventions, to give a proper assessment of 
the likely impact of inflation). In addition, there should have 
been direct consideration of the amount of net new capital 
formation which it was planned to fund from revenue. If this 
had been done, then the twin indicators implicit in the Final 
Determination of: 
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a) retained pre tax profits of over £800 million, and post tax 
profits of £550 million, (on the OFWAT conventions), over 
the four years 2006-10, and 
 
b) no less than £437 million net new capital creation funded 
out of revenue over the same period, 
 
should surely have rung danger bells. 
 
3.5   It might be argued that the Water Industry 
Commission, (WIC), could not in the event have departed 
significantly from the revenue caps set out in the final 
determination, because the Ministerial Guidance, and 
available public expenditure provision, were over-riding 
constraints. Over the period 2006-10, the final 
determination plans project that £30 million more public 
expenditure provision will actually be used than is being 
made available over the period: this implies that the 
available margin of  unused public expenditure, which was 
projected to be £256 million at the start of 2006, would 
reduce to £222.6 million at the end of 2010- (Final 
Determination Table 34.10). It is clear that the revenue 
caps could not have been set significantly lower without 
eroding the safety margin of unused public expenditure 
provision to a dangerously low level- or even using it up 
altogether. 
 
3.6 This argument, however, raises some deep issues 
about the proper role of the WIC. It seems to us that it 
would be perfectly reasonable for the WIC to raise with 
Ministers the implications of ministerial decisions, if these 
decisions were resulting in a situation where: 
 
a) excess retained profits are projected, implying the 
continuation of substantial overcharging throughout the 
final determination period; 
 
b) where normal principles of inter-generational equity are 
being breached, as regards the funding of capital 
expenditure, with today’s customers paying out of charges 
for the creation of substantial amounts of net new capital 
assets for the benefit of future generations; 
 
c) where, as a result of past and current overcharging, 
Scotland’s industrial base, and potential for development, 
is being damaged. 
 
3.7   In addition, it appears to us that there is another, 
longer term danger. This is the risk that the industry might 
be moving into a position where the public’s clearly 
expressed preference for Scottish Water to continue in 
public ownership will be frustrated. 
 
Because overcharging in strategic review 2002-06 reduced 
the need to borrow, the Scottish Executive was able to 
transfer significant amounts of public expenditure provision 
out of the water budget: the exact amounts are unclear, but 
probably around £500 million was transferred out in total. 
The reduced amounts of provision remaining in the water 
budget are very likely to cause real problems in the longer 
term- as the projections in the Final Determination itself 
illustrate. For example, projections on page 345 of the Final 
Determination show that, if investment continues over the 
period 2010-14 at the same level as now in real terms, then 
revenue will have to rise by 4.4% per annum over the 
period, (implying price rises significantly above inflation), 
and borrowing over the period will be some £150 million 
more than the public expenditure currently being made 
available: as a result, by the end of the period the safety 
margin of unused public expenditure provision would be 
almost exhausted. This would be an unsustainable 
position, unless prices rose even more steeply - or the 
Executive could find resources elsewhere within its budget 
to restore the provision it has transferred away from the 
water budget. It does not seem likely that the Executive 
would easily be able to find the required provision, given 
the other budgetary pressures it will be facing, and the fact 
that the privatised water industry in England does not 
generate any Barnett consequentials for Scotland. In these 
circumstances, the Executive will feel strong pressure to 
privatise Scottish Water: this would be extremely 
unfortunate given that, as we have noted above, the clear 
preference of the Scottish public is for water to remain in 
public ownership. 
 
4.  Conclusion: The unanswered questions 
4.1   In this paper we have shown that the straightforward 
application of the OFWAT financial ratios and targets to 
Scottish water is unjustifiable, given the different financing 
options open to Scottish Water, and the resulting different 
capital structures, compared to the English WASCs. But 
this is not just our view: the same conclusion is implicit in 
the OFWAT quotation given at the beginning of this paper- 
and, indeed, is also implicit in the quotation from the Final 
Determination given in para 2.9 above. 
 
The first question which the Water Industry Commission 
requires to answer is: why, then, were the unadjusted 
OFWAT ratios and targets applied in strategic review 2006- 
10? 
 
4.2   In section 3, we have identified what appears to be a 
critical difference in the methodology for calculating current 
cost profit, as between the regulatory accounts specified by 
OFWAT, and the WIC’s strategic review 2006-10. The 
OFWAT approach includes as an income element in the 
current cost profit and loss account the benefit arising from 
the eroding effect of inflation on outstanding debt: this term 
is apparently omitted from the corresponding Scottish 
accounts in strategic review 2006-10. This results in profits 
in Scotland apparently being understated. On the OFWAT 
convention, (which clearly appears to be the correct 
approach), cumulative current cost pre-tax profits for 
Scottish Water are projected to be over £800 million over 
the period 2006-10: this appears to be a grossly excessive 
level. 
 
Questions which require to be answered are: 
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Why was a different convention used in this part of the 
calculation, (particularly when, as regards the financial 
ratios employed, the Final Determination makes a 
supposed virtue of slavishly following the OFWAT 
conventions)? 
 
What can possibly justify such high levels of retained 
profit? 
4.3   Overall, the findings presented in this paper confirm that 
the overcharging in strategic review 2002-06, which we 
identified in our earlier papers, does extend, via different 
mechanisms, into the 2006-10 period. This means that: 
 
a)  there is a real risk of erosion of the customer base, 
because of the depressing effect that continuing high 
charges will have on Scottish industry, and hence on the 
important industrial component of the customer base; 
 
b)  the principles of inter-generational equity are being 
breached, because today’s customers are being forced to 
fund unjustifiably high amounts of the creation of net new 
capital assets out of current revenue. 
 
c)  More generally, because there is a real danger of 
Scottish Water being privatised, this would mean that 
Scotland would never receive the potential benefits which 
might legitimately have been expected from a publicly 
owned water company. Rather than paying what (on English 
experience) are likely to be excessive dividends to a private 
owner, public ownership gives the opportunity to return 
these dividends to customers in a variety of ways. These 
include lower charges, the pursuit of social justice 
objectives, and targeted support of industrial development. 
For example, it would be possible, by selective targeting of 
appropriate industrial uses, (as opposed to the present ill- 
judged blanket harmonisation of business charges), to pro- 
actively attract water intensive industry to Scotland - so 
exploiting what should be a natural comparative 
advantage. It should also not be forgotten that such a 
policy on water charges would be one of the few ways in 
which Scotland could legitimately, and cost effectively, 
circumvent the restrictions on selective aid to industry 
implicit in the EU’s anti-competitiveness Directives. If, in a 
climate of increasing global water shortage, the choice for 
Scotland lies between exporting water, and exporting 
virtual water, (that is, products whose manufacture involves 
high water usage), then we should be seeking to adopt the 
latter strategy - since that way, the value added in the 
manufacturing process remains in Scotland. It would be 
tragic if the opportunity of pursuing such a strategy were 
lost through privatisation. 
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